1. Bibliographic Entry. Cyberpower and National Security and Cyberspace and national security.  Multiple essays in each

2.  Author : Various

3.  Context:   Initial look at the big picture.  Cyber community is trying to develop a definition, legal boundaries, over arching strategy, etc. Essentially, a series of essays trying to get their arms around what cyber is, and how to manage it.

4.  Scope:  Lots of opinions.  A little history.  Not much to go on beyond this.

5.  Evidence/credibility:  Authors used the paltry amount of data available to max extent.  Stuxnet, Russians and Estonians, Georgians, etc.

6.  Central Proposition/Thesis: Essay dependent.  But over-arching theme is:

1.     We need a common definition, and even when we find one, it is often subject to change

2.     We need a cyber strategy to protect and exploit

3.     We need to start thinking about and using cyber as a spate domain to be exploited, and to protect our vulnerabilities.

7.  Sub-themes:

a.  From From Cvberspace to Cvberpower: Defining the Problem  

a.  25 A crucial and useful perspective was offered by offered by the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which defined cyberspace as the "nervous system-the control system of the country. . . composed of hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables that allow our critical infrastructures to work."5

b. 26 "Cyberspace is a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange information via networked information systems and physical infrastructures,"

c.  'Cyberspace means the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries.”

d. 28 cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment whose distinctive and unique character is framed y the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via interdependent and interconnected networks using information-communication technologies.

e.  29 First, cyberspace is an operational space where humans and their organizations use the necessary technologies to act and create effects, whether solely in cyberspace or in and across the other operational domains and elements of power.

f.  30 The second part of the definition is what truly makes cyberspace unique and distinguishes it from the other environments, for it is the use of electronic technologies to create and "enter" cyberspace and use the energies and properties of the electromagnetic spectrum that sets cyberspace apart.

g.  38 This leads to the definition of cyberpower as "the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in all the operational · environments and across the instruments of power,"

h. While cyberspace as an environment simply "is:' cyberpower is always a measure of the ability to use that environment.

i.   40 I These latter uses hint at what is perhaps the most significant and trans formative impact cyberspace and cyberpower are having, that of linking people and organizations in new ways in an increasingly wired world in which traditional borders and boundaries are being altered and new relationships among people being forged.

b. From “Toward a Preliminary Theory of Cyberpower “

a.  · 48 cyber strategy is defined as the development and employment of capabilities to operate in cyberspace, integrated and coordinated with the other operational domains, to achieve or support the achievement of objectives across the elements of national power.

b. 55 Several straw man cyberspace principles can be articulated. First, the offense has the advantage, in part because of the target-rich environment that an adversary faces. This situation makes it difficult for defense to prioritize and defend selected targets. In addition, the existing architecture makes it challenging to attribute an attack if an adversary seeks anonymity.

c.  65 If we go our own path to develop military theory, weapons, and equipment, we will develop something never seen before in places that no one has ever thought of before; others will be unable to anticipate or resist our 'self-accommodating systems.'" As an illustration of "self-accommodating systems" against a superior foe, three ways are cited for making a cat eat a hot pepper: "Stuff it down his throat, put it in cheese and make him swallow it, or grind it up and spread it on his back. The latter method makes the cat lick itself and receive the satisfaction of cleaning up. The cat is oblivious to the end goal. This is strategy."

d. 66 the full set of P /DIME options should be considered in developing a course of action to respond to a cyber attack

c.  from “Military Cyber power”

a.  276 Perhaps the best defining marker is that cyberspace is about networking, the two-way transfer of information, in contrast to broadcasting, in which information is transferred only one way.

d. From “Cyber Influence and International Security”

a.  343 .. Although the United States has an enormous cyber information capacity, its cyber influence is not proportional to that capacity.

b. 344 For the United States to be more effective, a three-part cyber strategy must be developed that combines:

                                               i. psychological and marketing expertise in the application of the principles of influence

                                             ii. domain expertise in the geographic, cultural, linguistic, and other arenas where the principles are to be applied

                                            iii. technical and management expertise in the use of cyber capabilities and tactics.

c.  In cyberspace, information communications technologies are used to create and transmit information and thereby generate influence.

d. 346 The international information environment is vast and complex. Multiple messages are being sent and received by multiple entities, simultaneously and generally in an uncoordinated fashion.

e.  347 :less: though culture is a good starting point in thinking about how to create influence, culture is not everything. Interest issues-the political, social, and economic imperatives-also will have huge impact. So, too, will the role of the sources of influence in the society, including key individuals, trusted advisors, and influence networks,18 The mindset and behavior of such individuals and networks will have significant impact on the interpretation of the message and, hence, on its influence.

f.  348 With respect to content, the most important understanding the communicator must achieve is that what he says is only part of the content.

g.  The point, however, is universal: words can only go so far in the face of real-world evidence that undercuts them or is otherwise more influential.

h. 350 A fourth use of cyber capabilities by the U.S. Government is what DOD calls information operations, which include "electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities."2R A key function of · information operations is "influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and use data, information, and knowledge.

i.   352 Segmentation, and a focus on the culture of less than an "all-world" mass audience, will need to be done by different message channels.

j.   A second problem for creating effective messages arises from what can be called the "problem of multiplicity," : that the United States has multiple goals and operates in a very complex world. The profusion of messages that the government generates reduces its capacity to have a single, focused message on any particular topic. It may be possible to help resolve the problem of multiplicity of messages by focusing on a regional or country basis. As a real-world matter, however, the GAO found that U.S. Embassies "did not have a core message or theme to direct their communications efforts." In fact, of the posts reviewed by G A<), none had a detailed communications plan

k. 353 u.s. status as an information superpower has not translated to international influence.

l.   perhaps most importantly, “information does not necessarily  change attitudes":

m.   Sixth, and in light of the foregoing, the authors concluded that the "above findings indicate clearly that those responsible for information campaigns cannot rely simply on 'increasing the flow' to spread information effectively."

n. 358 Second, the three types of expertise-geographic and cultural, psychological and marketing, and cyber technical-necessary for effective cyber communications need to be organized and coordinated with the military. To accomplish this, two fundamental shortcomings of the current system must be overcome.

o. The first shortcoming is that the necessary expertise does not exist in sufficient capacity or at high enough levels in either the State Department or DOD.

p. 359 First. and perhaps most important, greater focus must be placed on the nature of audiences and of the societies and cultures into which cyber-transmitted messages will be delivered. In the first instance, the intended recipients of messages need to be clear.

q. 360 Second, it will be necessary to increase the number of experts in geographic, cultural, and linguistic arenas. ;, Added to these cultural experts should be experts in psychologically and marketing who can help generate messages and ensure that communications are effective. In short, an interdisciplinary approach is required.

r.  Third, leaders must realize that while there may be a consistent base message, that message will be presented in multiple theaters. These areas will differ significantly, and to be effective, messaging will likewise differ.

s.  Fourth, greater resources must be given to overall strategic communications and influence efforts.

t.  Fifth, long-term communication efforts must be encouraged along with short-term responses. It is possible to change attitudes over time.

u. Sixth, we must fully appreciate that facts speak louder than words.

v. Seventh, the U.S. Government should not expect to be successful at strategic communications and influence operations acting on its own. Rather, it should use an alliance and partnership approach, both to expand capacities and increase effectiveness.

e.  From “,n Introduction to National Security and Cyberspace” in Reveron

a.  3 International Strategy for Cyberspace in May 2011, which defines four key characteristics of cyberspace: open to innovation, secure enough to earn people's trust, globally interoperable, and reliable.' Individual hackers, intelligence services, and criminal groups pose the greatest danger in cyberspace, not militaries.

b. l'he Defense Department strategic initiatives for operating in cyberspace include the following:

                                               i. treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that the Defense Department can take full advantage of cyberspace's potential.

                                             ii. employ new defense operating concepts to protect Department of Defense networks and systems.

                                            iii. Partner with other US government departments and agencies and the private .sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy.

                                            iv. Build robust relationships with US allies and international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity.

                                             v. · Leverage the nation's ingenuity through an exceptional cyberworkforce and rapid technological innovation.

c.  10·· . With these concerns in mind, the United Nations is working on a no-first-strike policy for its members, which is reminiscent of nuclear-weapons-use policy. When attempting to examine cyber threats, the point of origin is very difficult to determine.

d. 13 The biggest threat to civilian infrastructure is through cyber attacks of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.

f.  From “The Law of Armed Conflict and Cyber Conflict” from Reveron

a.  71 Rather, I identify four problems that arise in evaluating the use of cyber technologies under LOAC-the problems of application, attribution, assessment, and accountability. The problem of application identifies the difficulty of characterizing the use of ,  cyber technologies by state and non state actors. Whether an event constitutes an  armed attack, espionage, terrorism, or a crime is not always clear when computers and the Internet are used. the problem of attribution arises when victims of cyber acts cannot identify the perpetrators with confidence.

b. The assessment task confronts problems that arise with the legal principles as applied in non cyber contexts, such as controversies about the meaning of rules (e.g., the scope of the right of self-defense). Finally, the problem of accountability relates to the law's imperative to assign responsibility for regulated acts and consequences for violations. Cyber operations can dilute the ability to assign legal responsibility by creating ambiguities that undermine confidence in imposing consequences and create incentives that deter completion of accountability analysis.

g.  From “The Bear Goes Digital” from Reveron

a.  180 .' A final step taken by the Russian government has been to reach out to the sources of cyber threats-the hacker community-to enlist their services on behalf of the Russian state.

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